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AbstrAct
This article assesses U.S. security policy on U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry, before and after 
9/11. It tracks U.S. security policy’s impact over time by using multiple interrupted time-series 
(mit) and yearly time-series of border activity measures from 1994 to 2009. The results demons-
trate that, other things being equal, post-9/11 U.S. security policy changes had marginal effects; 
in other words, policy responses make no difference when their performance is compared on, 
before, and after 9/11; thus, U.S.-Mexico economic integration may be a stronger determinant 
of security at U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry.
Key words: U.S. security policy, intervention policy analysis, 9/11 impact assessment, econo-
mic integration.
resumen
Este artículo evalúa la política de seguridad estadunidense en los puertos de entrada terrestres 
Estados Unidos-México antes y después del 11 de septiembre. Revisa la política de seguridad 
de Estados Unidos y su impacto a través del tiempo empleando el análisis de series temporales 
múltiples interrumpidas y series temporales anuales de la actividad fronteriza para el periodo de 
1994 a 2009. Los resultados demuestran que mientras otros asuntos siguen igual, los cambios 
en la política de seguridad de Estados Unidos después de 11s han tenido efectos marginales. En 
otras palabras, las medidas adoptadas en materia de políticas públicas no han significado dife-
rencias si se compara su desempeño antes y después de esa fecha; en consecuencia, la integra-
ción económica entre los dos países podría ser un determinante de mayor importancia para la se-
guridad en los puertos de entrada terrestres Estados Unidos-México.
Palabras clave: Política de seguridad de Estados Unidos, análisis de políticas de intervención, 
evaluación del impacto del 11 de septiembre, integración económica.
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IntroductIon
To a large extent, territorial proximity between Mexico and the United States has deter-
mined the flow of goods, services, and people through ports of entry along the U.S.-Mex-
ico land border (Ramirez, 2009). As a consequence, border security has been a chal-
lenge for the U.S. government’s strategic security policy to secure the U.S. homeland 
after 9/11. Also, the outcomes of the 2008 presidential election made clear that the 
U.S.-Mexico land border is a political and policy concern in both security and economic 
terms, because of the increasing flows of people and trade through U.S.-Mexico land 
ports of entry. So, this article examines U.S. homeland security policy changes along 
the U.S.-Mexico land border before and after 9/11. Specifically, it investigates how 
and to what extent 9/11 impacted the dynamics of U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry.
So, section one overviews U.S.-Mexico economic integration in the context of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) and highlights the implications 
of that process for border security. The section therefore later examines the imple-
mentation of U.S. security policy programs (One Face at the Border and us-visit) to 
enhance security at U.S. ports of entry as mandated by post-9/11 legislation. The 
section places special emphasis on the organizational changes that principally affect-
ed the structure of U.S. security and immigration agencies in charge of protecting 
the U.S.-Mexican land border such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(ins). This will help to establish comparative patterns that actually explain security 
policy performance at U.S. ports of entry located on the U.S.-Mexican land border. 
Section two carries out a “before and after 9/11 policy assessment,” by making a 
comparative analysis of the impacts of 9/11 on the U.S. security and border protec-
tion policy on the U.S.-Mexico land border. In this section, extended time-series 
(1994-2009) of the variables and indicators used as proxy measures of border activity 
are analyzed to isolate out 9/11 as an intervention; the assessment of its effects are 
the main thrust of section two.
u.s. securIty And border protectIon polIcy After 9/11: 
A polIcy Assessment of the mexIcAn front
An Overview of the Trade Side: nAftA and Economic Integration  
In North America 
“Economics does not usefully exist apart from politics” (John Kenneth Galbraith, 
quoted by Barry Clark, 1998: 3), and “There is no such thing as a purely economic 
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issue” (Milton Friedman, quoted by Barry Clark, 1998:3), are assertions that may 
describe the U.S. economic policy approach to managing Mexico-to-U.S. bilateral 
relations. As Clark (1998: 18) put it, “Politics and economics are simply two facets of 
the process by which society is organized to achieve both individual and community 
goals. To study this process the . . . approach provided by political economy is essen-
tial.” In this regard, major political-economic events are at the core of political econ-
omy (Nurmi, 2006: 6; Watson, 2005). Thus, 1994’s North America Free Trade Agreement 
(nafta) became the major political and economic issue in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s (see McCarthy, 2006: 121-129). As Hettne (2006: 152) pointed out, the U.S. trade 
regionalist approach before 9/11 was subordinated to political interests and, “this is 
clear, for instance, in the case of nafta.”
Some (see Weintraub, 1990; Glade and Luiselli, 1989; Benett, 1989; Montes de 
Oca, 1993; Orme, 1996; Hufbauer, 1993) agree that “it is obvious that, in the aggre-
gate, the U.S. economy is dramatically more affluent and job-rich than the economies 
of any of its southern neighbours” (Mitchell, 1997: 40). If that is the case, the United 
States could use several economic policy instruments to affect bilateral relations. Ac-
cording to Martin (1997: 231), three instruments are the most feasible from the U.S. 
foreign policy perspective: 1) international trade; 2) foreign investment; 3) interna-
tional aid. And nafta fits well into the first category. Therefore, nafta was the instru-
ment preferred by the U.S. government to deal with its southern neighbor (see also 
Krugman, 1993; Glade and Luiselli, 1989; Ortmayer, 1997).
At this point, though nafta emerged as a U.S. foreign economic policy instru-
ment to promote economic integration in North America, it is fundamental to be 
clear that nafta’s main goal was to promote investment and trade among its signees. 
Originally, Canada and the United States initiated negotiations for a free trade agree-
ment; then in 1990, Mexico joined in to support Mexico’s government commitment 
to free market policies and economic restructuring. At the same time, nafta formal-
ized strong U.S.-Mexico economic integration and the opening of the Mexican econ-
omy to the world market.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize and refer to Mitchell’s argument 
(1997: 46) that suggests that the hegemonic (economic and political) role played by 
the United States in Mexico has been influential enough to push forward trade is-
sues like nafta. For instance, in 1993, as part of his campaign to win votes in the U.S. 
Senate and House of Representatives for the free trade agreement with Mexico, Pres-
ident William Clinton said, “If nafta passes, you won’t have what you have now, 
which is everybody runs up to the maquiladora line [U.S.-Mexico border], gets a job 
in a factory, and then runs across the line to get a better job. Instead there will be more 
uniform growth in investment across [Mexico], and people will be able to work at 
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home with their families. And over the period of the next few years, we will dramati-
cally reduce pressures on illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States” 
(quoted by Cornelius, 2002: 290). At the same time, then-President of Mexico Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari was promoting a pro-nafta television campaign with the slogan 
“Exporting goods, not people” (Cornelius, 2002: 290).
Campaigns to pass nafta through Congress were determined; in the United 
States President Clinton strongly lobbied U.S. congresspersons to pass it; in Mexico 
President Salinas de Gortari appealed to the Mexican public and Congress. But Mex-
ican political conditions were dramatically different from those in the U.S.; the 
Mexican political context was principally set up by the Mexican president because 
of his control over congressional approval (Browne, 1994; Krugman, 1993).
Along these lines, Peter Smith (1997: 265) summarizes all kinds of debate and 
discussion over nafta expectations and effects in four related hypotheses, as follows: 
H1: implementation of nafta would lead to a steady reduction in the flow of undocu-
mented workers from Mexico to the United States; H2: implementation of nafta 
would lead to acceleration in the flow of undocumented workers (and peasants) from 
Mexico to the United States; H3: implementation of nafta would have no observable 
effect on the flow of undocumented workers from Mexico to the United States, which 
would either a) continue at current levels, or b) increase gradually; and, H4: imple-
mentation of nafta would have a curvilinear effect on the flow of undocumented 
workers from Mexico to the United States, increasing the flow in the short to medium 
term, and thereafter reducing the flow. Without a doubt, intentionally or unintention-
ally, U.S. policy can directly or indirectly affect security levels in such a way that the 
flow of investment, trade, and people along the U.S.-Mexico land border do not rep-
resent a threat to national security. Neoclassical economic policies developed by in-
ternational institutions like the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World 
Bank (wb) and sponsored by the United States have caused certain disparities in eco-
nomic growth; visibly, such economic disparities have enlarged the gap between the 
income of poor and rich countries (Abya, 2004: 256). Thus, many poor people have been 
pushed to migrate, increasing security concerns in the United States as well as other 
developed countries; this is particularly true in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Therefore, in the context of border security priorities for U.S. government, “As a 
sovereign nation, it has always been important that we control our borders. But after 
the attacks of September 11, with the threat posed to our country by international 
terrorism, it is essential that we do so. . . . Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the 
primary focus of the Border Patrol was on illegal aliens, alien smuggling, and nar-
cotics interdiction. . . . After 9/11, it was apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, 
and modes of transportation are potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
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terrorists and result in terrorist weapons illegally entering the United States. The 
Border Patrol’s expertise in countering this threat is critical to ensuring the security 
of the United States” (U.S. Border Patrol National Strategy, 2004). Along these lines, 
every year more than a million people attempt to get across the U.S.-Mexican land 
border illegally. For instance, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 1 189 000 people in 
2005, of whom more than 90 percent were Mexican nationals, the rest of the detain-
ees were from Central and South America (Honduras, El Salvador, Brazil, Guatema-
la, and others). According to immigration reports released by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (dhs) the number of apprehensions declined to 724 000 in 2008 
(Rytina and Simanski, 2009: 1). However, according to the U.S. Office of Immigration 
Statistics, in 2010, 463 000 were apprehended, representing the lowest level since 
1972 and a 70-percent decrease compared to the previous peak at 1 676 000 in 2000. 
For the dhs, the decline in apprehensions may be the result of poor U.S. economic 
performance and enhanced border enforcement efforts, among other factors (Rytina 
and Simanski, 2009: 1-2; Rytina, 2011: 1). This situation has affected the perception 
about the U.S.-Mexican land border: Carafano and Heyman (2004: 25) point out that 
on the U.S. “southern border, over 20 000 ‘other than Mexican’ people from ‘countries 
of interest’ (e.g., Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan) are detained for illegally crossing the 
border,” making it more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. The U.S. government’s 
legitimate concern in dealing with undocumented migration as a national security 
issue is clear in President Bush’s statement made on October 26, 2006: “Ours is a na-
tion of immigrants. We’re also a nation of law. Unfortunately, the United States has 
not been in complete control of its borders for decades, and, therefore, illegal immi-
gration has been on the rise. We have a responsibility to address these challenges. 
We have a responsibility to enforce our laws. We have a responsibility to secure our 
borders. We take this responsibility seriously” (Bush, 2006).
To reduce the vulnerabilities along U.S. borders, particularly at ports of entry, 
the Department of Homeland Security created and implemented the “One Face at the 
Border” and us-visit programs. Both were intended to harmonize the immigration, 
customs, and agriculture process for U.S. visitors on entering the United States and 
the visa application process before arriving at a U.S. port of entry. Basically, the pro-
grams were created to expedite the identification of safe goods and travelers, so that 
potential terrorist threats to U.S. homeland security could not enter the United States. 
The next section presents an overview of the implementation of both programs.
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Security at U.S. Ports of Entry after 9/11: 
The Mexican Front of “One Face at the Border”
On September 2, 2003, the then-secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
announced the implementation of the Plan “One Face at the Border” (ofab). The ofab 
program was to unify the inspection processes at U.S. ports of entry. U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (cbp) officers were designated to carry it out. An important 
aspect of implementing the ofab plan was organizational. Before its implementation, 
the process of inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry included three steps: 1) im-
migration inspection; 2) customs inspection; and 3) agricultural inspection (when 
the travelers transported food or plants). However, ofab’s main task was to merge 
those three steps into a single process by cross-training cbp officers to carry out the 
three processes at any U.S. port of entry (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2009a). By unifying the inspection process, ofab created the position of cbp officer as 
part of the dhs. Since then, cbp officers have been trained to perform immigration 
(people), customs (goods), and agriculture (farm products) activities at ports of en-
try. In this way, a cbp officer became “the principal front line officer carrying out the 
priority mission [prevent terrorists from entering the U.S.] and the traditional cus-
toms, immigration, and some agriculture inspection functions” (Meyers, 2005a: 8).
According to dhs officials, ofab was to increase efficiency for managing U.S. 
ports of entry by creating the cbp position (White House, 2003), so that travelers meet 
a single inspection officer with the necessary training to determine what/who goes 
through secondary inspections. In this way, increasing efficiencies and unity around 
a single mission created significant levels of homeland security. Also, by getting the 
primary inspector trained to refer travelers whose information or actions raise ques-
tions to secondary inspectors, so additional questioning was completed at second-
ary inspection facilities to, a) prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering 
the country; b) deny entry to people seeking to enter illegally; and, c) protect U.S. 
agricultural and economic interests from pests and diseases. Finally, counter-terror-
ism response (ctr) inspectors are deployed as secondary inspectors to conduct fol-
low-up examinations of questionable passengers who could be tied to terrorism. ctr 
inspectors are responsible for, a) coordinating with the local Passenger Analysis Unit 
and National Targeting Center the research process for fully screening travelers; and, 
b) detaining travelers whom they find to be in violation of the law.
In this framework, for dhs officials, if one person performs three activities at the 
same time, the number of cbp and other dhs employees in secondary inspection facil-
ities may be increased. As a result, additional personnel are dedicated to track pas-
sengers with suspicious behavior in secondary inspection. For the dhs “unifying 
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three dedicated but separate workforces into one U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion Officer, cross-trained to address all three inspection needs, is another significant 
step toward Homeland Security’s effort to make the most effective use of the Depart-
ment’s assets and thus better secure our homeland” (White House, 2003). The main 
effects, if any, of ofab “may be more noticeable to travelers through the visual unifi-
cation that has occurred. cbp Officers (inspectors and supervisors alike) have been 
outfitted with dark blue uniforms, new patches, and new caps, all with the cbp logo.” 
Prior to the implementation of ofab, the officers of the agencies dressed differently 
(Meyers, 2005a: 11). Border Patrol agent Wendy Lee commented that ports of entry 
have undergone minor modifications, though more “Smart Border” and security in-
frastructure has been installed, and confirmed that cbp officers are trained to develop 
three tasks: immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections. Similarly, Meyers 
(2005a: 11) point outs that a visible advantage of ofab is that cbp officers are “a single 
point of contact with outsiders, a reduction in duplicative efforts, and the ability to 
allocate more resources to facilitating trade and travel and anti-terrorism efforts, in-
cluding having ports operate under the same alert level and the same set of guidelines.” 
cbp officers’ anti-terrorism effort is supported by the National Targeting Centers 
(ntc), which provide bio-terrorism prevention and radiological assessment at ports 
of entry. Though important for cbp officers, this high-tech technology tool is not visi-
ble to U.S. visitors while they go through the inspection process to enter the country.
the us-vIsIt progrAm
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology System (us-
visit program) is another U.S. government effort to enhance homeland security while 
potential terrorists intend to do harm on U.S. soil. In accordance with the provisions 
of the U.S. Patriot Act of 20011 and the post-9/11 legislation for homeland security, 
the secretary of homeland security created the us-visit program within the Border 
and Transportation Security (bts) Directorate, and implemented it on December 31, 
2004. us-visit was especially designed to “identify visitors who may pose a threat to 
the security of the United States, who may have violated the terms of their admis-
sion to the United States, or who may be wanted for the commission of a crime in the 
1  The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 mandated the implementation of an electronic entry-exit program to record the 
identities of visitors to the United States. However, this is related to a minor provision of the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which required the U.S. government to create 
and implement a similar program to prevent U.S. visa holders from overstaying their visas and violating 
the non-immigrant conditions of visitor and tourist visas.
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United States or elsewhere, while simultaneously facilitating legitimate travel and 
trade” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005: 6). It is important to note that 
us-visit is a biometric system that establishes the capacity to electronically record the 
entry and exit of the visitors passing through checkpoints at U.S. ports of entry. In 
this way, us-visit harmonizes entry-exit records. Thus, dhs officers may determine 
whether visitors overstay the period and conditions of their admission to the coun-
try by determining their identities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005: 6).
Initially, the program was implemented only at some U.S. land ports of entry: 
Douglas, Arizona; Laredo, Texas; and Port Huron–Blue Water Bridge, Michigan in 
November 2004. Later, it was completely implemented at the remaining U.S. air, 
land, and sea ports of entry. Basically, the program consisted of deploying an elec-
tronic system for cbp officers to record international travelers’ personal information 
(except that of U.S. citizens). For cbp officers, the registration process consists of pass-
ing the readable passports and visas through reader machines; after that, all foreign 
visitors (including nationals of countries in the Visa Waiver Program) travelling to the 
United States have their two index fingers scanned and a digital photo taken to match 
and authenticate their travel documents.2 The system is connected to anti-terrorism 
centers and terrorist watch-lists of the cia, fbi, dhs, and the U.S. Border Patrol to 
match travelers with wanted criminals and terrorists on the lists.3 Despite the sensi-
tive information that the U.S. government intended to collect by implementing the 
us-visit program, some exemptions have been applied to register Mexican and Cana-
dian nationals, who account for more than 80 percent of those crossing through U.S. 
land ports of entry on the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico land borders. In the case of 
Mexicans, the U.S. government issued a special type of visa (Biometric B1/B2/bcc), 
also known as the “Laser Visa.” This has been issued exclusively to Mexican nation-
als, and it allows them to enter the United States either on a business (B1) or tourist 
(B2) visitor, and for multiple entries through the U.S.-Mexican land border (Border 
Crossing Card, or bcc).
2  For further information about the us-visit enrollment and Visa Waiver Program, go to http://www.dhs 
.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/editorial_0527.shtm at the dhs website.
3  us-visit includes the following systems, among others: 1) the Arrival Departure Information System (adis), 
which stores traveler arrival and departure information; 2) the Advance Passenger Information System 
(apis), which contains arrival and departure manifest information; 3) the Computer Linked Application 
Information Management System 3 (claims 3), which encompasses information on foreign nationals who 
request benefits; 4) the Interagency Border Inspection System (ibis), which maintains “lookout” data and 
interfaces with the Interpol and National Crime Information Center (ncic) databases; 5) the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (ident), which stores biometric data of foreign visitors; 6) the Student Ex-
change Visitor Information System (sevis), a system containing information on foreign students in the United 
States; and, 7) the Consular Consolidated Database (ccd), which includes information about whether an 
individual holds a valid visa or has previously applied for a visa.
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Mexican nationals in possession of a bcc visa are exempt from enrolling in the 
us-visit program. More than 45 percent of the crossings through the U.S.-Mexican 
land border are bcc crossings (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005: 4). Cana-
dians who do not have a U.S. visa can be admitted to the United States with limited 
information, such as a passport or any other government-issued document that may 
be used to verify travelers’ identity. Mexicans using a “Laser Visa” issued prior to 
October 1, 2008 or a new laminated card (with enhanced graphics and technology) 
are required to register in the us-visit program only once by filling out a I-94 Form. 
They are allowed to use that I-94 Form for up to six months and for multiple entries; 
in this way Mexicans do not have to enroll in the us-visit each time they cross the bor-
der, but simply renew their I-94 Form when it expires. It is important to mention here 
that Mexicans with “Laser Visas” who cross the U.S.-Mexico land border are required 
to register in the us-visit program through the six-month I-94 Form only when they 
want to go 25 miles beyond the U.S.-Mexico border; otherwise they can use their “La-
ser Visas” to cross the border and move within a 25-mile radius from any point along 
the land border.4 For example, Mexicans crossing by land from Tijuana, Mexico to San 
Diego, California through San Ysidro can use their “Laser Visas” to go up to down-
town San Diego; if they attempt to go without an I-94 Form farther than that 25-mile 
limit, they are violating the conditions of their admission to the United States. So, the 
cbp Border Patrol in San Diego has a full-time traffic checkpoint on the northbound 
lanes of Interstate 5 in San Clemente, California, just outside of San Diego County 
and halfway to Los Angeles. The strategic location of the San Clemente checkpoint 
enhances the effect of Border Patrol activities against smuggling of illegal aliens and 
narcotics through the San Diego, California-Tijuana, Mexico land border.
Preliminary results of the security strategy show that from December 2004 to 
January 2007, the us-visit program processed more than 76 million visitors between 
the ages of 14 and 79. The U.S. government apportioned more than US$390 million 
for the program for fiscal year 2009 as a way to increase its biometric identification 
capabilities, which have resulted in more than 7 000 matches or “hits” on law en-
forcement databases. As a result, about 1 800 immigration violators and people with 
criminal records have been intercepted. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ice) office of the dhs has made more than 290 arrests based on overstay information 
collected from the us-visit program (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009b; 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2013).
4   For more details about the applicability of us-visit to Mexicans, see http://www.homelandsecurity.state 
.pa.us/homelandsecurity/cwp/view.asp?A=519&Q=172105, and U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Report, at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P2603.pdf, accessed September 2013.
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So far, apart from the us-visit program’s difficulty in enrolling travelers such as 
Mexican and Canadian nationals in multiple entries, it lacks an efficient automated 
component for tracking visitors’ exits; therefore, travelers are not required to enroll 
in any us-visit exit component. Without the exit component, the program is unable to 
match entry and exit records and cannot identify non-immigrants or visitors who 
violate the conditions of their stay in the United States. This feature and the impos-
sibility of registering multiple entries at U.S. ports of entry have weakened the pro-
gram and made it more unreliable for tracking possible threats along the U.S.-Mexi-
can land border. 
At this stage, it is still difficult to establish to what extent the implementation of 
both programs has increased U.S. homeland security by regulating the flows of peo-
ple through ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican land border to make it safer. This 
is particularly true if we take into consideration that ofab has marginally modified 
the security infrastructure at U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry, and its only organiza-
tional strength is the creation of the position of cbp officer to integrate three inspec-
tion processes into one. Nevertheless, the technology improvements are remarkable.
In addition, the us-visit Program has failed to register Mexican visa holders’ 
multiple entries, and it is incomplete without an efficient exit component to collect 
reliable records of departures, so that border protection policymaking can be more 
efficient in reducing negative impacts on migrants’ rights along the land border. It is 
also debatable whether the 9/11 events alone had a profound and lasting effect on 
the dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry. Thus, this article suggests that 
the level of integration between the United States and Mexico (economic, social, po-
litical, cultural integration) may be a stronger determinant of what is happening at 
U.S. ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican land border, and that dhs security pro-
grams have had only marginal effects, given the border’s long-standing dynamics. 
Therefore, the following subsection offers a more detailed analysis of this argument.
relAtIng 9/11 And border ActIvIty At u.s.-mexIco 
lAnd ports of entry: A stAtIstIcAl AnAlysIs
 In extending and expanding the narrow academic work on the effects of 9/11 on the 
dynamics of U.S. ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican land border, this article dev el-
ops a statistical analysis to contribute to estimating policy impacts. It utilizes month-
ly time series (1994-2009) of five measures of border activity at U.S. land ports of en-
try in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. These five measures are the 
number of bus crossings from Mexico to the U.S.; bus passengers, or the number of 
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people who crossed the border by bus; the number of pedestrian crossings; personal 
vehicles, or the number of private cars that crossed the border every month; and pas-
sengers in personal vehicles, or the number of people crossing the border in private 
cars. Also, we use a dummy variable to measure the intervention effect of 9/11 as 
temporary or permanent. In this case, a temporary effect of the 9/11 dummy means 
that the effect, if any, lasted for only one period of the monthly time series. In other 
words, a temporary effect of 9/11 in this analysis lasts only one month and disappears 
in the t+2 period or in the next month (in general, t = t+1 ≠ t+2…t+n). A permanent ef-
fect of 9/11 persists until the end of the time series (t = t+1 = t+2…t+n), in this case until 
the last month of 2004. The 9/11 dummy is dichotomous with zero before 9/11 oc-
curred and one on and after the months after 9/11; here it is important to note that 
this techniques makes it possible to isolate solely the effect of 9/11.
For example, from 1994 to 2009 more than one billion personal vehicles crossed 
the border from Mexico to the U.S., and almost three billion passengers in personal 
vehicles; about 3.6 million buses crossed the border, and more than 45 million people 
crossed as bus passengers. Finally, more than 670 million pedestrians crossed (see 
Table 1, which shows the aggregated values of the monthly data set from 1994 to 
2009 for each measure of border activity and U.S. border states).
Table 1
MEASURES OF BORDER ACTIVITY AT U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY ON THE 
U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER, 1994-2008
1994/2009 Personal Vehicles
Passengers in 
Personal Vehicles Bus Crossings Bus Passengers Pedestrians
California 411 705 275 881 928 294 1 875 173 1 969 364 239 939 865
Arizona 139 954 678 329 744 321 163 627 2 404 015 135 622 730
New Mexico 8 220 680 20 086 543 14 057 177 537 2 982 702
Texas 674 560 642 1 547 661 480 1 559 779 26 121 725 291 998 535
Total 1 234 441 275 2 779 420 638 3 612 636 45 672 641 670 543 832
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, n.d.
Disaggregated data from Table 1 is used for the analysis of interrupted time se-
ries (its). First, the formal relationship between the variables in this its approach is
Yt = α + β1 (I1) + β2 (I2) + …βn (In) + Et
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Yt = the dependent variable at time t (bus crossing, bus passengers, pedestrian 
crossing, number of vehicles, passengers per vehicle)
β 1….n = parameter estimate
I1…n = independent intervention variable coded as a dichotomous dummy 
(9/11)
E = error term.
Some studies in the social sciences have used its linear regression techniques to 
analyze the long-term effects of single public policy interventions, economic phenom-
ena, or other social events. For instance, Lewis-Beck (1979: 1131-32) analyses the eco-
nomic effects of revolutions and applies the its approach to investigate the effects of 
the Cuban Revolution on Cuban sugar production; Foweraker and Landman (1997: 
195-224) are known for using a version of multiple time series (mits a modified ver-
sion of its) to correlate measures and indicators of citizenship rights and social 
movements for multiple years; Glass, Tiao and Maguire (1971) employed its regres-
sion analysis for estimating the effects of the 1900 revision of German divorce laws on 
divorce rates and petition for divorce; Box and Tiao (1975) carried out an interven-
tion analysis with applications to economic and environmental problems. In their 
research, they raised questions like, “Given a known intervention, is there evidence 
that change in the series of the kind expected actually occurred, and, if so, what can be 
said of the nature and magnitude of the change?” (Box and Tiao, 1975).  Box and Tiao 
(1975: 70) examined the case of two policy interventions to reduce the pollution level 
in downtown Los Angeles in the 1960s.5 
Second, autoregressive techniques facilitate relating border activity (dependent 
variable) and 9/11 (independent dummy variable).6 Thus, by regressing the dependent 
variable on the independent variable, the effects, if any, are distinguishable; in other 
words the 9/11 effect is isolated out. The regression results are to identify the magnitude 
of the effect the intervention has on the dependent variable, the type of effect (negative 
or positive), and the significance of the effect; the analysis presented here is only concerned 
with investigating the type and significance of the effect of 9/11 on border activity, and 
not with the magnitude (Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 197; Morh, 1995).
Returning to the case of this research and its purposes, Table 2 shows the signs 
of the linear regression parameter estimates and their significance that resulted from 
regressing the five measures of border activity at ports of entry for each of the U.S. 
5 Also see Morh (1995) for further details of the its technique and intervention analysis.
6 Autoregressive techniques are useful for solving the problem of autocorrelation common in interrupted 
time series; therefore, in this section, autoregressive linear models are run to estimate the parameter estimates 
shown in Table 2. 
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border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) on the 9/11 dummy 
variable. It is important to note that 40 its regressions were run in total for all possi-
ble effects; this is five temporary and five permanent effects of 9/11 on the measures 
of border activity for four border states ([5temporary + 5permanent] * 4states = 40). Howev-
er, Table 2 only includes those results that are theoretically and statistically consis-
tent. From the table, it is clear that only six results out of twenty show temporary, 
positive, and significant effects for 9/11. The vertical left line of Table 2 shows the 
five measures of border activity;  the 9/11 variable and the U.S. border states (Cali-
fornia, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) are along the top row of the table. The signs in 
parentheses reveal the type of effect that 9/11 had on each measure of border activi-
ty for each U.S. border state. At the same time, Table 2 shows the temporary or per-
manent effect, and the level of significance that the independent variable (9/11) had 
on the dependent variable (measures of border activity). In the case of California, 
9/11 had a positive, but temporary effect on the measures of personal vehicles and 
passengers in personal vehicles. The rest of the cases are not significant. Similarly, 
Arizona has two positive and temporary effects from 9/11, one is personal vehicles 
and the other is passengers in personal vehicles. Finally, Texas, similarly to Califor-
nia and Arizona, has two positive effects from 9/11: on personal vehicles and passen-
gers in personal vehicles (Table 2 below summarizes this information).
Table 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON BORDER ACTIVITY  
AT PORTS OF ENTRY ON THE U.S.-MEXICAN LAND BORDER
Independent Variable 
9/11
California Arizona New Mexico Texas
Bus Crossings (+)1 (-)1 (+)1 (+)1
Bus Passengers (-)1 (+)1 (+)1 (+)1
Pedestrian Crossings (+)1 (-)1 (+)1 (-)1
Personal Vehicles
     (+)***
Temporary












Notes: *P<. 10,   **p<. 05,   ***p<. 001. 
1 non significant. Independent Variable = 9/11 temporary/permanent dummy
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So far, the its regression analysis has served to establish the type and significance of 
the 9/11 effects. In the six significant cases with a positive effect, this means that 9/11 
somehow temporarily increased (one monthly period) the flows of people crossing 
by car, and the number of personal vehicles entering through California, Arizona, and 
Texas; whereas the cases in which there is no statistical significance, the 9/11 interrup-
tion had no effect at all. This may suggest that perhaps other variables may be more 
strongly related to border activity, but they are not a concern of this analysis. The 
findings are inconclusive, and some caution is necessary in interpreting them, as they 
may appear counter-intuitive. However, they may be explained in part by the increased 
uncertainty that emerged along the U.S.-Mexican land border when the U.S. govern-
ment wanted to seal off the border for an undetermined period, or until the U.S. secu-
rity agencies gained complete control of it in the aftermath of 9/11. At the same time, 
even when uncertainty was high and increasing daily after 9/11, the following factors 
must be taken into consideration and any conclusion must be viewed with caution:
•  Data availability, its nature, and the its approach: the data to build the measures of 
border activity is monthly because activity between ports of entry along the 
U.S.-Mexico land border is not the main thrust of the research. The events of 
9/11 occurred almost halfway through September. Whatever type of disruption 
was caused by 9/11, it took place in the three or four weeks after September 11, 
as suggested by qualitative information gathered from talks with locals on the 
California-Mexico land border and Border Patrol agents. On the one hand, this 
means that September and October 2001 partially captured shockwave from 
9/11, which was probably divided over the two monthly periods of the data. On 
the other hand, in this analysis, the its approach assumes that a temporary effect 
lasts one period after the intervention or shock. In other words, September 2001 
is the period of intervention; this lasted until October 2001, the month after the 
intervention, and disappeared during the next monthly period.
•  U.S.-Mexico Interdependence: as argued earlier, the temporary effect of 9/11 may 
be explained by the strong U.S.-Mexico economic, social, and political interde-
pendence. These factors may be seen as stronger determinants of the dynamics 
of the U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry; the big flows of people and trade forced 
U.S. security officials to return border activity to normal as soon as possible after 
9/11 as lines of people and cars stretched for miles, lasted for hours, disrupting 
the regular flows of students and workers, and cutting the supply lines of cross-
border manufacturing networks (Weintraub, 1990; Krugman, 1993; Martin, 
1993; Russell, 1994; Ortmayer, 1997; Bair, 1990; Cornelius, 2002; Pastor, 2002; 
Hanson, 2004; Meyers, 2003; Papademetriou, Cooper, and Yale-Loehr, 2005).
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Therefore, only a temporary effect from 9/11 is expected; this makes the results 
of Table 2 more reasonable since a permanent effect would make no sense, given the 
integration between Mexico and the U.S. border states. In other words, in the cir-
cumstances of the present analysis permanent effects might be a-theoretical. For in-
stance, the states of California, Arizona, and Texas have solid, long-standing two-way 
connections of trade, people, and culture with Mexico, factors that make permanent 
disruption from 9/11 implausible. Furthermore, this integration process has strength-
ened since nafta took effect in January 1994.
To a certain extent, the results reported in Table 2 formalize this situation. As 
pointed out at the beginning of section one, a free-trade-agreement approach emerged 
as a U.S. foreign economic policy instrument to promote economic integration in 
North America. It is fundamental to make clear that the issue of Mexican undocu-
mented “economic” migration was not the main reason for creating nafta. Indeed, 
the main goal of nafta was to promote investment and trade among its members. 
Originally, Canada and the United States initiated negotiations for a free trade agree-
ment; then, in 1990, Mexico joined the negotiations to support the Mexican gov-
ernment’s commitment to free market policies and economic restructuring. At the 
same time, nafta formalized the strong U.S.-Mexican economic integration and the 
opening of the Mexican economy to the world market. However, Mexican trade rep-
resentatives put the issue of undocumented “economic” migration from Mexico on 
the table for discussion. 
Expectations of including undocumented migration as part of nafta disappeared 
when U.S. trade representatives tried to include Mexico’s oil industry along the lines 
established for discussing undocumented migration. In the end, both issues were 
left aside in the negotiations because they were considered two sensitive issue areas 
by U.S. and Mexican public opinion. So, given the policy assessment approach ad-
opted in the research presented here, I argue that the linkage between nafta and un-
documented economic migration was based on political concerns. In other words, 
here, my contention is that, to make the agreement politically feasible, nafta pro-
moters in Mexico and the U.S. utilized the issue of undocumented “economic” mi-
gration to “sell” the agreement and gain political approval on the basis that nafta 
could reduce undocumented migration.
Alternatively, certain qualitative data may provide some insight into the quanti-
tative analysis of the findings already reported already in Table 2. For example, dur-
ing field research in the San Diego area, people commented that for several weeks 
after 9/11, wait times for crossing the border rose to more than six hours. Raul Gon-
zales Rodriguez mentioned that on 9/11 he was queuing to cross the border from 
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Tijuana to San Diego, when suddenly ins personnel started closing the entries.7 The 
entrance remained closed for more than four hours, after which ins personnel 
opened the lanes to let cars and people cross. However, each and every car and per-
son was carefully searched because there was information suggesting that terrorists 
could use the U.S.-Mexico border to get away to Mexico (Meyers, 2003).
Professor Rodriguez and other interviewees along the border commented that 
many Tijuana residents work in San Diego and other towns on the U.S. side, so they 
were afraid of losing their jobs if the border was sealed off permanently. For that rea-
son, many people began to move to California or stayed there longer until border-
crossings times were back to normal. People who decided to move to California re-
turned to pick up their families and belongings in Tijuana. This ensured that the 
number of people crossing the border increased as did the number of vehicles. The ins 
search process and the number of people and cars crossing the border upped the cross-
ing “wait times.” Weeks later, things seemed to return to normal, so flows of people 
and cars began to stabilize, and the border crossing wait times returned to normal, too.
fInAl remArks
To a large extent, this study constitutes an attempt to gain further understanding of 
the potential of U.S. security policy changes for protecting the U.S.-Mexico land bor-
der against international terrorism and undocumented migration in the aftermath of 
9/11. The analysis carried out in this article intends to answer the following general 
question: Do post-9/11 U.S. security and border protection policies make any differ-
ence in the protection of the U.S.-Mexican land border against international terror-
ism? In particular, it investigates how and to what extent 9/11 impacted the dynam-
ics of U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry. With that aim in mind, the article examines the 
implementation of the “One Face at the Border” and us-visit programs that were im-
plemented to secure U.S. sea, air, and land ports of entry against undocumented 
immigration and terrorist infiltration. This policy analysis facilitated the assessment 
of the impact of these programs, and 9/11 itself on activity in U.S.-Mexico land ports of 
entry. It was carried out by using its regression analysis as a technique to relate five 
7  Raul Gonzales Rodriguez is a university professor in Chicano studies and U.S. American history at cetys 
Universidad in Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. He also teaches Mexican-American culture at San Diego 
State University (sdsu). He crosses the border four or five times a week either to teach at sdsu or shop in San 
Diego and San Ysidro, California. Professor Gonzales was the contact in the California-Mexico border area 
for collecting qualitative data and carrying out interviews with local people and potential Mexican undoc-
umented migrants.
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measures of border activity (bus crossings, crossings of passengers on buses, pedes-
trian crossings, personal vehicle crossings, and crossings of passengers in personal 
vehicles) and a 9/11 dummy variable to estimate the effects as temporary or perma-
nent. Within this framework, the balance of evidence presented throughout pro-
vides elements to assess U.S. security policy performance on the Mexican front. 
First, as previously noted, the ofab and us-visit programs were implemented as part 
of post-9/11 security policy changes; however, those changes only slightly modified 
the operation of U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry. This is because the position of the 
dhs official was created to merge three inspection activities into one. In these circum-
stances, this type of policy change is mostly symbolic and only guarantees a more 
secure port of entry rather than a safer one. Therefore, a process of restructuring se-
curity programs offers limited results and unsuccessful policies. Second, the analy-
sis of the Mexican front also demonstrated that, other things being equal, U.S.-Mexi-
co economic and social integration largely determine the dynamics of U.S.-Mexico 
land ports of entry. The its analysis showed, for example, that if 9/11 had any impact 
on the land ports, it was temporary, but unimportant, in Texas, California, and Ari-
zona, and had no impact at all in New Mexico. In this way, the findings uncovered 
by the analysis, though tentative, constitute a dimension that deserves deeper and 
more considered work. After 9/11, academic research on U.S.-Mexico land border 
activity will always be needed, in particular, research focused on the interactions of 
economic integration and security priorities in North America.
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